With the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD), market behavior around earnings releases displays no signi¢cant change in return volatility (after controlling for decimalization of stock trading) but signi¢cant increases in trading volume due to di¡erence in opinion. Analyst forecast dispersion increases, and increases in other measures of disagreement and di¡erence of opinion suggest greater di⁄culty in forming forecasts beyond the current quarter. Corporations increase the quantity of voluntary disclosures, but only for current quarter earnings. Thus, Reg FD seems to increase the quantity of information available to the public while imposing greater demands on investment professionals.
GOVERNMENTS REGULATE SECURITIES MARKETS with a variety of goals in mind. A £ow of information that is accurate, e⁄cient, and fair contributes to a well-functioning capital market that satis¢es the needs of all users and enhances economic growth and stability. A continuing concern of regulators and investors is ''selective disclosure, '' the practice of companies disclosing important information to certain securities analysts and institutions. Former U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur Levitt (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2000a) , p. 1) speaks of information as ''the lifeblood of strong, vibrant markets''and warns that ''when that information is used to pro¢t at the expense of the investing public, when that information comes by way of favored access rather than by acumen, insight, or diligence, . . . we risk nothing less than the public's faith and con¢dence in America's capital market. '' As part of the former chairman's drive to improve transparency and fairness in U.S. stock markets, the SEC approved Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) on August 10, 2000. Reg FD is intended to level the playing ¢eld by reducing THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE VOL. LVIII, NO. 6 DECEMBER 2003 n Bailey and Li are from Cornell University, Mao is from Temple University, and Zhong is from Fordham University. We are grateful to First Call/Thompson Financial and I/B/E/S for providing us with much of the data used in our study. We thank the editor, Rick Green, and the anonymous referee for many useful comments. We thank Haluk Unal, Rex Thompson, and Kumar Venkataraman for helpful discussions, Charles M. C. Lee for help in obtaining the First/Call database, and Mancang Dong for technical support. Previous versions of this paper circulated under the title ''Regulation FD and Market Behavior around Earnings Announcements: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?''Any errors are our own. information disparities between individual and institutional market participants.
1 Reg FD prohibits selective disclosure of material information and requires broad, nonexclusionary disclosure of such information. For example, an advance warning about earnings telephoned to a security analyst must also be immediately released to the public with a press release, open conference call, or other public communication.
Aside from increasing public con¢dence in U.S. ¢nancial markets, proponents believe that Reg FD will improve the £ow of information to ¢nancial markets. Corporate managers can no longer treat material information as a commodity to gain favor with analysts, who in turn feel pressure to issue favorable reports to maintain access to those corporations. Analysts must conduct more independent research rather than depending on data ''spoon fed'' by corporate management. Recipients of selective disclosures will no longer be able to trade on what is, in e¡ect, private information that can reduce liquidity and increase price volatility (Admati and P£eiderer (1988) ). The regulation may also contribute to alleviating incentive problems when analyst and investment banking activities occur under the same roof (Teo (2000) ).
Skeptics counter that, despite its good intentions, Reg FD will chill corporate disclosure and trigger an ''information brownout. '' If the materiality standard is vague, companies will restrict discussions with analysts and institutional investors to avoid potential SEC legal action. Communication will be reduced to ''sound bites, '' ''boilerplate'' disclosures, or large amounts of nonmaterial and raw information of little value to analysts and the public at large.
2 This, in turn, impedes the process (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) ) by which informed trading incorporates information into prices rapidly and e¡ectively, thereby enhancing market e⁄ciency.
3 By hampering the ability of analysts to obtain and interpret new information and, thus, contribute to the formation of market consensus, a regulation intended to equalize the quantity and quality of information available to ordinary investors may instead leave them worse o¡.
Are concerns about Reg FD legitimate or merely an excuse for investment professionals to protect their undeserved privileges? Does this well-intentioned regulation have unintended and undesirable consequences? Given what is at stake in this debate, understanding the impact of Reg FD on ¢nancial markets is an important empirical question with profound practical implications.
In this paper, we assess the impact of Reg FD on stock market responses to earnings releases, on the earnings forecasts produced by analysts, and on the extent to which corporations voluntarily disclose information. A seemingly signi¢cant decline in return volatility at times of earnings announcements after the implementation of Reg FD is due to decimalization of stock trading rather than the adoption of Reg FD. There are signi¢cant increases in trading volume due to di¡erential informed judgment or di¡erence in opinion after controlling for other factors.While the accuracy of analyst forecasts of quarterly earnings seems unchanged, forecast dispersion increases signi¢cantly. Furthermore, increases in other measures of disagreement and di¡erences of opinion among analysts suggest that forecasting earnings beyond the current quarter has become more di⁄cult after the imposition of Reg FD. Finally, there is unambiguous evidence of increased voluntary corporate disclosure, though only for forthcoming quarterly earnings.
In some respects, Reg FD serves its intended purpose: Legal remedies are now in place to punish privileged communications, and our evidence shows that listed companies o¡er a greater quantity of voluntary disclosure to the public. At the same time, Reg FD imposes costs on market participants: We also ¢nd that disagreement among traders and analysts has increased since the regulation was adopted. This may validate complaints about Reg FD from the investment industry, or may predict that more e¡ort and struggle on the part of analysts and other investment professionals will enhance market e⁄ciency.
Our paper is part of a growing body of research inspired by the SEC's approval of Reg FD in the summer of 2000. Shane, Sonderstrom, and Yoon (2001) , Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman (2002) , Gadarowski and Sinha (2002) , and He£in, Subrahmanyman and Zhang (2003) report that return volatility decreases signi¢cantly after Reg FD. In contrast, we attribute this decrease to decimalization rather than Reg FD itself. Eleswarapu et al. use intraday data to measure trading costs and ¢nd that information asymmetry has declined with Reg FD, particularly for small or illiquid stocks. Straser (2002) reports a decline in the proportion of informed traders but an increase in proxies for information asymmetry and private information. Topaloglu (2002) ¢nds that institutions trade higher amounts during the event period, rather than pre-announcement, after the imposition of Reg FD, while Gintschel and Markov (2002) ¢nd a reduced impact of analyst forecasts, particularly from ''high reputation'' brokerages. These papers indicate that Reg FD induces substantial changes in the information environment, as is also suggested by our results on disagreement. In studies of analyst forecasts, Shane et al. and He£in et al. ¢nd little post Reg FD change in the accuracy or dispersion of quarterly analyst forecasts, while Agrawal and Chadha (2002) report that both have increased, especially for small, information-poor, or unpro¢table ¢rms in certain industries. Topaloglu and Irani and Karamanou (2002) report increased forecast dispersion after Reg FD, Monhanram and Sunder (2001) ¢nd that increases in forecast errors and dispersion after Reg FD do not extend to ''all-star'' analysts, and Zitzewitz (2002) indicates that analysts respond more to public releases. We ¢nd no increase in forecast errors, but signi¢cant increases in forecast dispersion and other indicators of disagreement. Straser and He£in et al. report 
increased voluntary disclosure after
Reg FD, as we report here as well. 4 Our paper contributes to unifying and interpreting the diversity of empirical facts presented by this growing literature.
The balance of our paper is organized as follows. Section I describes our data and methodology. Section II presents event-study evidence, while Section III examines the impact on analyst forecasts and corporate voluntary disclosure. Section IV is a summary, conclusion, and agenda for future research.
I. Experimental Design

A. Comparison Periods and Data
To study the impact of Reg FD, we compare market behavior around earnings releases, analyst forecasts, and corporate voluntary disclosures before and after implementation of Reg FD. Given that Reg FD became e¡ective on October 23, 2000, we de¢ne the fourth ¢scal quarter of 2000 (IV 2000) and the ¢rst and second ¢scal quarters of 2001 (I 2001 and II 2001) as our ''post Reg FD''quarters. 5 We also de¢ne two kinds of ''pre Reg FD'' comparison quarters. First, we use the same ¢scal quarter in the previous year to capture any quarter-speci¢c e¡ects. The First Call database is our source for quarterly earnings announcements, analyst forecasts, and corporate voluntary disclosures. The daily stock price, adjusted return, trading volume, and shares outstanding are obtained from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) of the University of Chicago. Our sample consists of all December year-end ¢rms with quarterly actual and forecast earnings per share and earnings announcement date in the First Call database, and returns and trading volumes from CRSP for the post Reg FD quarter of interest and its comparison quarter. 6 4 Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller (2002) , Sunder (2002), and Irani (2003) take an imaginative approach to the impact of Reg FD on voluntary disclosure by studying conference calls before versus after Reg FD. 5 We have only three quarters since adoption of Reg FD because our First Call database extends through August 2001 only. Reg FD is e¡ective as of October 23, 2000, that is, about three weeks into the fourth quarter of 2000. One concern is that companies disclose information regarding fourth quarter of 2000 earnings to analysts during the ¢rst 3 weeks before Reg FD is enforced, thus partially contaminating IV 2000 with disclosure not controlled by Reg FD. Contamination may occur for other quarters as well: Companies can guide analysts with information regarding earnings for several forthcoming quarters. However, such contamination should decay over time after October 23, 2000. Having three post Reg FD quarters in our study can help us assess the relative strength of the impact of Reg FD over time. 6 We eliminate all ¢rms with a ''DDC'' code indicated in the First Call database. The DDC code denotes some form of discontinuity in the EPS series arising from events such as accounting change and mergers and acquisitions.
B. Methodology
B.1. Matched-pairs Comparison
We compare changes in a variety of market and analyst variables across pairs of pre Reg FD and post Reg FD quarters as described previously.We follow standard event-study practice to generate return and volume residuals. De¢ning the earnings announcement date as day 0, abnormal stock returns are generated using one-factor market model residuals estimated from day À 200 to day À 11. The CRSP value-weighted index return is used as a proxy for market return. Abnormal return volatility is the absolute value of daily abnormal returns, summed over a window spanning the earnings announcement. Abnormal trading volumes are di¡erences between trading volume and the mean of daily volume for that stock over the pre-announcement window (À 200, À 11), normalized by the mean volume, then summed over a window spanning the earnings announcements.T-tests and sign tests assess the signi¢cance of the mean and median within-¢rm change across pairs of pre and post Reg FD comparison quarters.
We also compare di¡erent aspects of analyst forecasts before and after the imposition of Reg FD. The absolute consensus forecast error is the absolute value of the di¡erence between a ¢rm's reported earnings for a quarter and the mean of most recent analyst forecasts for the quarter.The absolute time-series forecast error is the absolute value of the seasonal change in a ¢rm's quarterly earnings. The analyst information advantage is the di¡erence between a particular absolute consensus forecast error and the corresponding absolute time-series forecast error. Intuitively, this measures the ''value added'' by the analyst (He£in et al. (2003) ). Analyst forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of individual analyst most recent forecasts of a ¢rm's quarterly earnings. All forecast variables are scaled by the stock price at the end of the pre Reg FD comparison quarter.
B.2. Cross-sectional Regressions
To further assess the impact of Reg FD on return volatility and trading volume after controlling for several ¢rm characteristics, we estimate multivariate regressions. For return volatility, the dependent variable is the absolute value of the abnormal return (computed from the market model) cumulated over a 3 -day period (days À 1, 0, and 1). For trading volume, the dependent variable is cumulative mean-adjusted trading volume over the same 3 -day period. We construct explanatory variables for the cross-sectional regressions following Yoon and Starks (1995) , Atiase and Bamber (1994) , and others. Absolute consensus forecast error is de¢ned above and serves in regressions to explain return volatility. Firm size is the market value of common shares outstanding at the end of the quarter. It can re£ect for the amount of information available about the ¢rm, 7 market liquidity, average precision of investors' private predisclosure information, or other basic cross-sectional di¡erences in information environment across ¢rms. Pre-announcement information asymmetry is proxied with the dispersion in 7 The idea is that larger ¢rms tend to draw more press and analyst coverage.
analyst earnings forecasts as de¢ned above. Additionally, the event-period abnormal return is used as an explanatory variable in regressions to explain abnormal volume. Previous authors have documented a signi¢cant positive relation between trading volume and the magnitude of returns at earnings announcements (Karpo¡ (1987) and Atiase and Bamber) and, as discussed below, this relation may be uniquely useful in identifying the nature of the market reaction to earnings. Finally, speci¢cations for both abnormal return and abnormal volume include dummy variables to distinguish events occurring before versus after the imposition of Reg FD. Table I summarizes characteristics of our sample ¢rms and principal variables that we examine in our event-study and cross-sectional regression tests. Across the seven quarters that we study, the number of ¢rms ranges from 1,683 to 2,144, while average ¢rm size ranges from $897 million to $1.178 billion. Our sample appears comprehensive in that it includes both small and large ¢rms, rather than only including relatively large ¢rms as in many studies (e.g., Barron and Stuerke (1998) ). The median number of analysts per ¢rm is ¢ve, which appears low. Again this may be due to the inclusion of many small ¢rms in our sample. The average absolute earnings surprise and analyst forecast dispersion are similar across Size is the ¢rm's market capitalization, analysts is the number of analysts following a particular ¢rm, the absolute consensus forecast error is the absolute value of the di¡erence between actual earnings and consensus forecasts scaled by stock price at the end of the pre Reg FD quarter, and forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of the most recent individual forecasts. Abnormal stock returns are computed based on one-factor market model residuals estimated from day À 200 to day À 11 with CRSP value-weighted index returns. Abnormal return volatility is the absolute value of daily abnormal returns, summed over the window indicated. Abnormal trading volumes are generated as the di¡erences between trading volume and the mean of daily volume for that stock over the pre-announcement window (À 200, À 11) normalized by the mean volume, then summing over the period indicated. quarters. There appears to be considerable variation in abnormal market behavior across quarters, particularly for volume.
Number of
II. Reg FD and Market Responses to Earnings Releases
A. Univariate Behavior of Abnormal ReturnVolatility and TradingVolume
We begin by examining how abnormal return volatility and trading volume around earnings releases di¡er before versus after the adoption of Reg FD in October 2000. Table II reports univariate summary statistics for six pairs of comparison quarters. Abnormal stock returns are computed based on one-factor market model residuals estimated from day À 200 to day À 11 with respect to CRSP value-weighted index returns. Abnormal return volatility is the absolute value of daily abnormal returns, summed over the (À 1, þ 1) window. Abnormal trading volume is the di¡erence between trading volume and the mean of daily volume for that stock over the pre-announcement window (À 200, À 11) normalized by the mean volume, then summing over the same window.
8 Results computed over windows of (À 1, 0), (À 2, þ 2), and (À 1, þ 5) are similar to those for (À 1, þ 1) and are available on request.
Panel A of Table II presents univariate summary statistics on abnormal return volatility around earnings releases.The results suggest a strong and uniform pattern of decreases in announcement period return volatility after the adoption of Reg FD. Return volatility in the post Reg FD quarters is signi¢cantly lower than in their pre Reg FD comparison quarters. All mean and median di¡erences are statistically signi¢cant at better than the 1% level for all six pairs of comparison quarters.
Panel B of Table II presents univariate summary statistics on abnormal trading volume around earnings releases. Much of the theoretical and empirical literature on asset markets and information indicates that examining trading volume adds to our understanding of the market reaction. While security prices aggregate or average investor beliefs into a consensus price, the summing of individual trades into aggregate trading volume represents di¡erences in investor interpretations of an accounting disclosure.These di¡erences are suppressed in the averaging process that yields prices. Thus trading volume is more re£ective of individual di¡erences in obtaining, interpreting, and responding to an earnings event. Furthermore, previous empirical papers have documented a positive relation between trading volume and measures of di¡erent aspects of disagreement among traders. Theoretical models of stock trading and anticipated corporate news arrival (Kim and Verrecchia (1997) , e.g.) demonstrate a relation between trading activity and ''disagreement'' among heterogeneous traders who seek and interpret pre-announcement and announcement period information. Therefore, excess trading can be viewed as a symptom of such disagreement whether it results from di¡erential information or di¡erences in opinion.
In contrast to our ¢ndings for return volatility, Panel B of Table II shows Abnormal stock returns are computed based on one-factor market model residuals estimated from day À 200 to day À 11 with CRSP value-weighted index returns. Abnormal return volatility is the absolute value of daily abnormal returns, summed over the window indicated. Abnormal trading volumes are generated as the di¡erences between trading volume and the mean of daily volume for that stock over the pre-announcement window (À 200, À 11) normalized by the mean volume, then summing over the period indicated.''Change'' measures the mean and median within-¢rm change after Reg FD adoption. P-values are two sided, from t-tests for means, and from sign tests for medians. The results are similar over (À 1, 0), (À 2, þ 2), and (À 1, þ 5) windows. 
B. Multivariate Regressions to Explain Returns and Volume around Earnings Releases
Previous authors have identi¢ed several factors that explain return volatility around earnings announcements such as ¢rm size, the number of analysts following a ¢rm, the absolute consensus forecast error as a measure of the earnings surprise, and the dispersion in analyst forecasts (El-Gazzar (1998) ). To control for the impact of these variables, we estimate multivariate regressions to assess the change in return volatility after implementing Reg FD. Panel A of Table III presents the results of cross-sectional regressions to explain return volatility around earnings announcements. The return volatility cumulated over (À 1, þ 1) is regressed on ¢rm size, absolute forecast error, forecast dispersion, and a dummy variable, POST, to indicate the post Reg FD period.
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In Panel A of Table III , coe⁄cients on ¢rm size are signi¢cantly negative, which suggests that return volatility around earnings releases is particularly large for smaller ¢rms. This is consistent with the empirical results documented by previous authors (El-Gazzar (1998) ). Investors may have less incentive to gather pre-disclosure information about smaller or lightly followed ¢rms and, as a consequence, the market reacts more to an earnings shock. The estimated coe⁄-cients on the absolute consensus forecast error are positive and signi¢cant, which is consistent with previous empirical ¢ndings. Larger earnings shocks yield larger market reactions. The coe⁄cients on analyst forecast dispersion are mainly insigni¢cant. The sign and signi¢cance of the coe⁄cient on the POST dummy variable is consistently strong and negative across the six comparison quarters, suggesting lower post Reg FD return volatility around earnings releases, even after controlling for other ¢rm characteristics.
Panel B of Table III presents cross-sectional regressions to explain abnormal trading volume. In the model of Kim and Verrecchia (1997) , investors employ two types of private information at earnings announcements. Pre-announcement information is private information gathered in anticipation of a public disclosure. Event-period information is a direct product of di¡erential information processing or di¡erential informed judgment across investors stimulated by the earnings release.
10 Models based exclusively on one type of information yield incomplete empirical implications involving price change and volume reactions. Their general model with both pre-announcement and event-period information yields some interesting insights: Trading volume at the earnings announcement Table III Cross-sectional Regressions to Explain Abnormal Stock Return Volatility and Trading Volume Abnormal return volatility and trading volume over a 3 -day window (days À 1, 0, and 1) are regressed on explanatory variables. A dummy variable, POST, equals 1 for quarterly earnings event after Reg FD adoption, 0 for earlier comparison quarter. Size is the ¢rm's market capitalization, the absolute forecast error is the absolute value of the di¡erence between actual earnings and consensus forecast scaled by stock price at the end of pre Reg FD quarter, and forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of the most recent individual forecasts. Abnormal stock return volatility also serves as an explanatory variable for abnormal trading volume. White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent p-values are reported beneath each coe⁄cient estimate. Speci¢cations with number of analysts, rather than size, to proxy for the ¢rm's information environment yield similar results. The Journal of Finance is positively related to the absolute value of the contemporaneous price reaction, pre-announcement di¡erential informedness, and event-period private information (or di¡erential informed judgment). Thus, we can isolate trading volume stimulated by di¡erential informed judgment by controlling for absolute return change and our ¢rm size and forecast dispersion variables that proxy for preannouncement di¡erential informedness. This motivates the regression speci¢-cations we estimate to explain trading volume. For simplicity, we adopt a linear and additive speci¢cation of the regression model following Stober (1997, 1999) . In Panel B of Table III , abnormal trading volume over (À 1, þ 1) is regressed on ¢rm size, return volatility cumulated over the same window, analyst forecast dispersion, and the POST Reg FD dummy variable.
11 Given the importance of the return volatility term in the theoretical literature, we also add a slope dummy term to assess changes in the relation between volume and return after Reg FD is imposed. We include two regression speci¢cations with and without control variables for each pair of comparison quarters.Without including the other variables, the sign and signi¢cance of the POST dummy varies across di¡erent comparison periods. This is consistent with the lack of a de¢nite pattern in volume indicated in Table II . For the second speci¢cation, the coe⁄cients on absolute return are uniformly signi¢cantly positive, while the coe⁄cients on the POST Reg FD slope dummy for absolute return are uniformly signi¢cantly negative. Thus, abnormal trading volume is positively related to absolute return, which is consistent with the empirical ¢ndings of previous authors (Karpo¡ (1987) and Atiase and Bamber (1994) ). The signi¢cant negative coe⁄cient on the absolute return slope dummy indicates that the positive association between volume and price change is signi¢cantly weaker after the adoption of Reg FD. Unreported tests of the sum of coe⁄cients on absolute return and its slope dummy suggest that this relation remains signi¢cantly positive after the introduction of Reg FD, even if its magnitude declines. Firm size and forecast dispersion proxy for the pre-announcement information environment. The coe⁄cients on ¢rm size are sometimes signi¢cantly positive while those on forecast dispersion are significantly negative.
The estimated coe⁄cients on the POST dummy are positive and highly signi¢-cant at better than the 1% level in all regressions. Recall that the unconditional level of volume indicated in Table II , Panel B does not show a uniform pattern of change after Reg FD is e¡ective. Once we control for absolute return (which re£ects the change in aggregate market expectation at the time of the earnings shock) and include proxies for pre-announcement di¡erential informedness, what remains is trading volume generated by di¡erential informed judgment (or di¡erence in opinions).Thus, the strong positive coe⁄cient on POST indicates that trading due to di¡erential informed judgment increases signi¢cantly after the adoption of Reg FD. Moreover, the estimated coe⁄cients imply an 11 Results for trading volume cumulated over di¡erent windows like (À 1, 0) and (À 1, þ 5) are very similar to those for (À 1, þ 1). Speci¢cations with the number of analysts, rather than ¢rm size, to proxy for the ¢rm's information environment yield similar results. economically large impact: After the imposition of Reg FD, abnormal trading volume attributed to di¡erential informed judgment increases, on average, by 31%.
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C. Does Decimalization Matter?
Our results thus far suggest that Reg FD reduces return volatility around times of earnings releases. However, our sample spans the period when the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq ''decimalized'' stock trading by reducing tick sizes to one cent. This can have a signi¢cant impact on trading activity. Ronen and Weaver (2001) , for example, ¢nd that reduced tick size is associated with reduced return volatility when the AMEX adopted 1/16 ticks in May 1997. To test whether decimalization a¡ects our event-study results, we repeat the cross-sectional regressions of Table III with an intercept dummy for earnings events that occurred after decimalization of trading in the particular stock. Given the timing of the decimalization program, the number of pairs of ''before''and ''after'' Reg FD quarters available for study is reduced.
13 Put another way, we can only study those post Reg FD quarters for which data is available on both decimalized and undecimalized stocks.
14 Table IV presents the results. In all regressions to explain return volatility, the decimal dummy is strongly signi¢cant while the POST dummy is insigni¢cant. The apparent decrease in return volatility at earnings releases (in Panel A of  Tables II and III and in Shane et al. (2001) , Eleswarapu et al. (2002) , and He£in et al. (2003) ) is due to decimalization rather than Reg FD. In contrast, the decimal dummy has little impact on our volume results: Our ¢nding that trading volume at earnings releases increases signi¢cantly after the adoption of Reg FD remains strong. 15 In brief, we ¢nd no signi¢cant change in return volatility and an increase in abnormal volume after the adoption of Reg FD.
There is an interesting parallel in the theoretical and empirical literature. In Kim and Verrecchia (1997) , trading volume is independent of the absolute value of price change when there is only event-period private information. Thus, volume can arise without a price change at public news release, as has been documented in Kandel and Pearson (1995) for U.S. earnings announcements. Our results suggest that Reg FD may not change the £ow of pre-announcement private information substantially. However, the pattern of no change in return volatility and increased abnormal volume suggests that Reg FD may stimulate event-period private information about future earnings as a result of increased di¡erences in 12 The average of coe⁄cients on POST for the second speci¢cation in Table III , Panel B. 13 The NYSE and AMEX were fully decimalized on January 19, 2001 and the Nasdaq on April 9, 2001. Small numbers of stocks that underwent earlier decimalization are not present in our ¢nal sample of companies. Therefore, only one post Reg FD quarter, IV 2000 (i.e., the ¢scal quarter whose earnings releases would occur in the ¢rst few months in 2001), is available for study, and is compared to pre Reg FD quarters III 2000 and IV 1999. 14 Our other two post Reg FD ¢scal quarters, I 2001 and II 2001, are e¡ectively ''post decimalization. '' 15 We thank the referee for pointing out the potential impact of decimalization on our results.
opinions. This can be interpreted as enhancing market e⁄ciency if it re£ects more information gathering and processing by analysts and traders who can no longer rely on special access to corporate information.
D. Correlation between Return and Volume Reactions
Previous authors have found that the strength of reaction to earnings can differ across price and volume. Kandel and Pearson (1995) report signi¢cant abnormal volume even in the absence of a substantial contemporaneous return reaction. Bamber and Cheon (1995) ¢nd that nearly 25% of earnings events display price and volume reactions of very di¡erent relative magnitudes. Kandel and Pearson argue that only models with di¡erential interpretation of public information across investors can generate market behavior consistent with such empirical ¢ndings. In other words, di¡erential informed judgment (or di¡erence in opinions) can lead to di¡erent price and volume reactions.Therefore, another interesting way of assessing di¡erential informed judgment is to examine the frequency of earnings announcement events that stimulate large volume reactions 16 We focus on how the frequency of these events differs in comparing pre Reg FD periods to periods since the adoption of Reg FD. Across our six sets of comparison periods, the proportion of earnings events classi¢ed as large volume^small price reactions uniformly increases after the adoption of Reg FD. The increase in the proportion ranges from 14.05% to 45.39% depending on the particular quarters compared, and averages 23.54%. This result is consistent with our ¢ndings from the multivariate regressions: The association between price change and volume becomes weaker under Reg FD. Recall that the theoretical models of Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Kim and Verrecchia (1997) imply that a large volume-small price reaction is largely due to di¡erential informed judgment at the time of the earnings release.Thus,TableVcon¢rms the idea that, after the imposition of Reg FD, event-period private information due to di¡erential informed judgment increases signi¢cantly.
E. Further Diagnostics
We conduct an additional check on the robustness of our event-study ¢ndings. We look for shifts in the balance between pre-announcement and announcement abnormal return volatility after the adoption of Reg FD. This serves two related purposes. First, we can measure the extent to which Reg FD appears to have altered the pre-announcement environment. Second, we can determine if the''e¡ec-tive'' earnings announcement date has shifted forward in time before adopting Reg FD since Reg FD may attenuate pre-announcement leakage of the contents of earnings releases. Following El-Gazzar (1998), pre-announcement return volatility equals the average absolute return from the end of the quarter to 2 days before the earnings announcement for the quarter. Earnings announcement volatility equals the average absolute return over (À 1, þ 1). Thus, the degree to which the ratio of pre-announcement to event volatility exceeds one indicates, on average, how much more earnings information per day is conveyed prior to the formal release versus at the time of the release. The ratio is immune to decimalization e¡ects. 16 The theoretical model in Kandel and Pearson (1995) indicates that the large volumeŝ mall price reaction case only occurs in the presence of di¡erence in opinion among investors. It does not suggest any connection between a ''small volume^large price reaction'' event and di¡erence in opinion. Therefore we do not assess the change of frequency of small volumel arge price reaction events. Reg FD IV 1999 , IV 2000 versus III 2000 , and I 2001 versus III 2000 , the ratio of pre-announcement return volatility to announcement period return volatility increases signi¢cantly after the adoption of Reg FD. For the other three pairs, the ratio decreases, though the magnitude of the decrease seems smaller than the increases observed for the others.Thus, there is no de¢nitive evidence on the extent to which Reg FD is associated with more or less pre-announcement price volatility relative to announcement period volatility.Therefore, these results o¡er no clear evidence of a change in the pre-announcement environment after the adoption of Reg FD. In particular, there is no evidence that Reg FD prevents or enhances information leakage at the pre-announcement period.
III. The Impact of Reg FD on Analysts and Corporate Disclosure
In the previous section, we studied the impact of Reg FD through the lens of stock trading activity around earnings announcements. Most notably, the TableV   Summary Statistics from Contingency Tables of Abnormal Trading Volume Reaction Deciles by Abnormal Return Volatility Deciles
We classify reactions to earnings announcements into return volatility and trading volume deciles and tabulate the frequency of earnings events in each volume-return reaction decile cells. We de¢ne large volume^small return reaction events as those for which the di¡erence between the volume and return deciles is ¢ve or more. ''Change'' represents the percentage change in events with large volume^small price reactions in post Reg FD quarter. cross-sectional regressions evidence on abnormal trading volume suggests that Reg FD has signi¢cantly increased di¡erential informed judgments or di¡er-ences in opinion, thereby stimulating trading volume. In this section, we seek further speci¢c evidence of the impact of Reg FD on the ability of a class of investment professionals, ¢nancial analysts, to perform e¡ectively. We also measure the extent to which corporations have increased or decreased voluntary public disclosures to, in some sense, replace private communication now banned by Reg FD.
TableVI Univariate Analysis of the Ratio of Pre-announcement Return Volatility to Event-period Return Volatility
Following El-Gazzar (1998), pre-announcement return volatility is the average absolute return from the end of the quarter to 2 days before the earnings announcement for the quarter. Earnings announcement event volatility is measured over window (À 1, 0) or window (À 1, þ 1). The degree to which the ratio of pre-announcement to event volatility exceeds one indicates, on average, how much earnings information per day is conveyed prior to the formal release relative to the amount of information per day conveyed around the time of the release.''Change'' measures the mean and median within-¢rm change after Reg FD adoption. P-values are two sided, from t-tests for means, and from sign tests for medians. Results are similar over window (À 1, 0 
A. The Behavior of Pre-announcement Analyst Forecasts
The intention of Reg FD is to level the playing ¢eld and take away the advantage that ¢nancial analysts and others with privileged access to ¢rms enjoy relative to ordinary investors. However, the new regulation may cause a chilling e¡ect: Companies may become less forthcoming in public announcements for fear of litigation problems, and may be reluctant to reveal detailed information to the public for fear of bene¢ting competitors.The chilling e¡ect may be especially signi¢cant on information regarding earnings beyond the current quarter. Cutting o¡ private communication between companies and analysts may impair the ability of analysts to form opinions and reach consensus on interpreting earnings information, which in turn increases di¡erential informed judgment among investors upon earnings releases.
TableVII Univariate Analysis of Analyst Forecasts
Absolute consensus forecast error is the absolute value of the di¡erence between reported earnings for a quarter and the mean of most recent analyst forecasts. Absolute time series forecast error is the absolute value of the seasonal change in quarterly earnings. Analyst information advantage equals absolute time series forecast error minus absolute consensus forecast error. Analyst forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of the most recent forecasts of quarterly earnings. Table VII presents summary statistics on several aspects of analyst forecasts before and after the adoption of Reg FD.To save space, data are aggregated across all comparison quarters matched by ¢scal quarters or by proximity to Reg FD implementation rather than presenting pairs of comparison quarters individually as in previous tables. The aggregated results are similar to what is found in the unreported individual quarterly summaries (available upon request).There is no consistent evidence of change in the absolute consensus forecast error after the adoption of Reg FD. 17 The sign and magnitude of the change varies depending on whether we match by ¢scal quarter or by proximity to Reg FD, and whether mean or median is examined.The time-series forecast error and analyst information advantage generally increase after the adoption of Reg FD. However, the signi¢cance of the change depends on whether mean or median is tested. In contrast, we observe unambiguously strong evidence that analyst forecast dispersion increases signi¢cantly after Reg FD is adopted, regardless of whether
TableVIII Analyst Forecasts across Business Cycles
This table compares forecast behavior in post Reg FD quarters with quarters from the early 1990s economic downtown matched on either proximity to the business cycle peak or quarterly seasonality. Forecast variables are de¢ned in Table VII IV 1989 , I 2001 and I 1990 , and II 2001 and II 1991 . In Panel B, we aggregate all comparison quarters match by proximity to business cycle peak, including quarters IV 2000 and II 1990 , I 2001 and III 1990 , and II 2001 and IV 1990 .''Change'' measures the mean and median within-¢rm change after Reg FD adoption. P-values are two-sided, from t-tests for means, and from sign tests for medians. The results are similar to those of individual pairs of comparison quarters, which are available upon request. Table VII suggests that forecast dispersion increases after Reg FD, we note that some of our ''before''and ''after''periods span di¡erent points in the business cycle. In particular, our post Reg FD quarters represent a period of rising economic uncertainty and disappointing corporate earnings relative to our pre Reg FD quarters.Therefore, we also benchmark analyst behavior in post Reg FD quarters against quarters from an earlier economic cycle. The NBER's ''Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions'' 18 indicates a business cycle peak around the middle of our post Reg FD sample, March 2001, and an earlier peak at July 1990. Table VIII presents summary statistics that compare quarters centered on the July 1990 peak to our post Reg FD sample of quarters centered on the March 2001 peak. The post Reg FD quarters and early 1990s quarters are matched on either quarterly seasonality or proximity to the business cycle peak. Again, we present averages rather than individual quarters.
The most notable ¢nding in this table is that, based on means though not medians, post Reg FD forecast dispersion is lower than in comparison quarters (matched on either proximity to the business cycle peak or quarterly seasonality) from the early 1990s downturn. Although we do not report results for individual quarters, this ¢nding is consistent across di¡erent pairs of quarters, is typically signi¢cant for means, but typically insigni¢cant for medians. Put another way, forecast dispersion is generally higher in the early 1990s regardless of whether we compare quarters before, at, or after the business cycle peak. However, we must note that the two business cycles are qualitatively di¡erent. The introduction of Reg FD in October 2000 precedes the March 2001 business cycle peak by several months, but occurs 7 months after the stock market peak in March 2000. In contrast, business cycle and Wilshire 5000 stock market peaks in the early 1990s coincide exactly at July 1990. The July 1990 peak is also associated with the invasion of Kuwait and higher oil prices while the peak of 2000/2001 is associated with the collapse of ''dot com'' stock prices and technology business. In addition, the information environment, corporate earnings disclosure policy, and information tools utilized by analysts di¡er in comparing 2001 to 1990. This could contribute to the di¡erence in analysts forecast dispersion between the two periods. Finally, one pair of comparison quarters (post Reg FD IV 2000 versus pre Reg FD III 2000) are very close in time and occur entirely prior to the formal business cycle peak of March 2001. Thus, this comparison pair is drawn from similar business cycle conditions and the ¢nding that forecast dispersion increases with Reg FD cannot be ascribed to substantially di¡erent phases of the business cycle. Therefore, it appears that, with the adoption of Reg FD, forecast dispersion has probably risen, although it does not exceed historical norms suggested by the early 1990s evidence.
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18 www.nber.org/cycles.html. 19 See additional evidence on business cycle e¡ects consistent with our interpretation in Agrawal and Chadha (2002) .
B. Belief Revisions and OtherAspects of Disagreement among Analysts
In the analysis above, forecast dispersion is a measure of pre-announcement disagreement among analysts. It is not necessarily directly related to di¡erential informed judgment stimulated by the earnings release. Furthermore, disagreement has many facets. For example, Karpo¡ (1986) suggests that trading volume in periods immediately after an informative announcement may result from ''prior dispersion of beliefs'' or ''jumbling'' of beliefs. ''Prior dispersion'' refers to the predisclosure variation in beliefs across analysts, which is analyzed in Table VII . ''Jumbling'' refers to information-triggered belief revisions that di¡er across analysts. It is of particular interest, as it can re£ect disagreement triggered by an earnings announcement, that is, di¡erential informed judgment. In our earlier cross-sectional regression to explain abnormal trading volume, we try to isolate trading volume arising from di¡erential interpretation of earnings by controlling for price change and di¡erences in pre-announcement informedness. Bamber et al. (1997) illustrate three distinct di¡erent aspects of disagreement among analysts and the incremental role of each in explaining trading volume around earnings announcements. Dispersion in prior beliefs is the level of variation in expectations before the earnings announcements. It is measured as the standard deviation of all analysts' forecasts of annual earnings issued within 45 days of the interim earnings announcements, scaled by the absolute value of the mean annual earnings forecasts. Belief jumbling occurs as investors' beliefs change positions relative to each other around the earnings announcement. It is measured as one minus the correlation between annual earnings forecasts issued in the 45 days before the interim earnings announcement and annual earnings forecasts issued within 30 days after the interim earnings announcements. Change in dispersion is the di¡erence in the level of dispersion in beliefs after versus before the interim earnings announcement. It is measured as the standard deviation of annual forecasts issued within 45 days before an interim earnings announcement minus the standard deviation of annual earnings forecasts issued within 30 days after an interim earnings announcements. The change is de£ated by the absolute value of the mean pre-announcement forecast.
Belief jumbling re£ects some of the analyst disagreement resulting from di¡er-ences in opinion. Kandel and Pearson (1995) develop an empirical measure that isolates di¡erential belief revisions attributable exclusively to di¡erence in opinion rather than predisclosure private information. Their measure identi¢es pairs of analyst forecasts that move in opposite directions and also either £ip (i.e., cross) or diverge (i.e., move farther apart).The Kandel and Pearson measure is the proportion of such movements in all possible pairs of analyst forecasts revisions. Bamber et al. (1999) show that the Kandel and Pearson measure is signi¢cantly correlated with trading volume around earnings announcements. Thus, the Kandel and Pearson measure can be used as a direct test of whether Reg FD induces more di¡erential informed judgment.
In Table IX , we document post Reg FD changes in the measures de¢ned by Bamber et al. (1997) and Kandel and Pearson (1995) . Given sample restrictions, The table summarizes several measures of disagreement. Dispersion of annual earnings forecasts before interim quarterly earnings announcement equals the standard deviation of all analysts' forecasts of annual earnings issued within 45 days prior to the interim earnings announcement, scaled by the absolute value of the mean annual earnings forecasts. Dispersion of annual earnings forecasts after interim quarterly earnings announcement equals the standard deviation of all analysts' forecasts of annual earnings issued within 30 days after the interim earnings announcement, scaled by the absolute value of the mean annual earnings forecasts. Change in forecast dispersion equals the standard deviation of annual forecasts issued within 45 days before the interim earnings announcement, minus the standard deviation of the annual earnings forecasts issued within 30 days after the interim earnings announcements.The change is de£ated by the absolute value of the mean pre-announcement forecast. Belief jumbling around interim earnings announcements is measured as one minus the correlation between annual earnings forecasts issued in the 45 days before the interim earnings announcements and annual earnings forecasts issued within 30 days after the interim earnings announcements. To be included in our analysis, an analyst must issue a forecast of annual earnings within 45 days before the quarterly earnings announcement and the same analyst must issue a revised forecast of annual earnings within 30 days after the quarterly earnings announcement. Each ¢rm must have at least four such analysts. Panels B, C, and D summarize the Kandel and Pearson (1995) measure of di¡erence in opinion. For all possible pairings of analysts for each quarterly announcement, the Kandel and Pearson measure is the proportion of analyst pairs whose forecast revisions both move in opposite direction, and either £ip or diverge. For all panels, ''change'' measures the mean and median within-¢rm change after Reg FD adoption. P-values are two-sided, from t-tests for means, and from sign tests for medians. 20 We do not compare post Reg FD quarters with III 2000 since seasonality is very important for annual forecasts. The number and quality of annual forecasts in the third quarter are not comparable to those in the second quarter. 21 The Kandel and Pearson (1995) measure identi¢es pairs of analysts' forecasts that move in opposite directions and also either £ip or diverge. This is a much more stringent proxy for di¡erences in opinion than belief jumbling. It aims to identify analyst behavior exclusively due to di¡erences in opinion in a Bayesian model, rather than due to di¡erential predisclosure information. In many cases, we may not observe any behavior satisfying the stringent requirement, and the measure equals zero.
shows that, after Reg FD is adopted, the Kandel and Pearson measure decreases for 25% of ¢rms, remains unchanged for 37% of ¢rms, and increases for 38% of ¢rms.Tests reported in Panel D show that mean and median of the change of the measure after Reg FD are signi¢cantly positive. 22 Thus, this measure of di¡er-ence in opinion increases signi¢cantly after the adoption of Reg FD. This supports our earlier ¢nding that Reg FD is associated with increased di¡erential informed judgment.
C. Do Firms Respond to Reg FD with More Public Disclosure?
We conclude by examining the response of corporations to Reg FD. In Table X , we examine the change in the quantity of voluntary earnings-related disclosures after Reg FD is implemented.The source of corporate news releases that contain estimates or discussions of current or future earnings releases is the ''Company Issued Guidance'' (CIG) ¢le of the First/Call databases. For each ¢scal quarter we study, we examine the number of voluntary earnings-related disclosures occurring between the actual earnings announcement date for the previous quarter and the actual earnings announcement release date for the current quarter.
In Table X , the average number of total disclosures per ¢rm (including news about current and future earnings) across all our sample ¢rms increases signi¢-cantly after the adoption of Reg FD. This result is robust across six pairs of comparison quarters, regardless of whether we exclude earnings disclosures occurring on the same day as the actual earnings announcement.While the average number of disclosures about current earnings increases signi¢cantly and uniformly after Reg FD, there is some spotty evidence that the average number of disclosures about future earnings decreases after Reg FD for some comparison quarters. Overall, only a small fraction of ¢rms voluntarily discloses information about current earnings, and voluntary disclosures about future earnings are even more unusual. Therefore, we also measure the change in the proportion of sample ¢rms making at least one such disclosure. Unreported results (available upon request) indicate that the proportion of such ¢rms typically increases after the adoption of Reg FD.While the results are robust and uniform with respect to disclosures about current earnings, the results on disclosures about future earnings are inconclusive.
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How do the results on voluntary releases by corporations relate to our ¢ndings on analyst forecasts and market reactions? We ¢nd that corporate information releases about forthcoming earnings increase, return volatility at earnings announcements does not increase, and the accuracy of analyst forecasts of current 22 Since more than 50% of observations having KP measures equal to zero in both quarters II 2000 and II 2001, the median values of the KP measure are zero in both quarters. However, a nonparametric sign test is able to examine the null hypothesis that the change in median is zero.
23 Straser (2002) uses a smaller sample of ¢rms and a smaller time period, but broader sources of company releases to conclude that the quantity of voluntary disclosure has increased. He£in et al. (2003) also report an increase in voluntary corporate disclosures. Bushee et al. (2002) document changes in the use and impact of conference calls. quarterly earnings does not deteriorate, though forecast dispersion increases after the adoption of Reg FD. On the other hand, there is more trading volume due to di¡erences in opinions, more of a struggle in the form of belief revisions for forecasts of earnings beyond the current quarter, and no clear increase in voluntary releases concerning earnings beyond the current quarter. Therefore, We obtain corporate news releases that contain estimates or discussions of current or future earnings from the CIG ¢le of the First/Call databases. For each ¢scal quarter we study, we compute the number of disclosures occurring between the actual earnings announcement date for the previous quarter and the actual earnings announcement date for the current quarter. The ''current quarter''column represents voluntary disclosures regarding the forthcoming earnings announcement. The ''future quarter'' column represents voluntary disclosures regarding the quarters beyond the current quarter.The''total''column includes both types of disclosures. Analysis is conducted with samples that either include or exclude disclosures occurring on the same day as the actual earnings announcement. ''Change'' measures the mean within-¢rm change after Reg FD adoption. P-values are two-sided, from t-tests for means. there may be a term structure to the impact of Reg FD: Greater di⁄culty with distant forecasts is the cost of more ''fairness'' with little e¡ect on short-run forecasts. It may also be the case that companies are not comfortable releasing vague longer-horizon information publicly due to potential legal problems but, prior to Reg FD, were willing to discuss such information privately to analysts since they have the expertise to process such information. Furthermore, the increase in voluntary disclosure does not seem associated with a clear increase in the quality of information: The change in pre-announcement return volatility (versus eventperiod return volatility) after Reg FD is ambiguous. Straser (2002) also documents an increase in corporate disclosure after the adoption of Reg FD. However, this is accompanied by a signi¢cant increase in information asymmetry and a higher probability of private information in the ¢nancial market. Thus, companies may be responding to Reg FD with an increased quantity of lower quality public information releases.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
We study the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure with stock market reactions to earnings announcements, analyst behavior, and corporate voluntary disclosures across several pairs of quarters that span the regulation's adoption in October 2000. Our results reveal a variety of facets to the impact of Reg FD. While there is no evidence that return volatility at earnings announcements is a¡ected after controlling for decimalization, volume reveals substantially increased differential informed judgment (or di¡erence in opinions) among investors after Reg FD came into force. A detailed examination of analyst forecasts indicates that several dimensions of disagreement among analysts increase after Reg FD came into force, con¢rming our interpretation of evidence on volume. In particular, it appears that the ability to forecast future annual earnings is made more di⁄cult by Reg FD, although the accuracy of forecasts of current quarterly earnings seems una¡ected.
In surveys of market participants recently conducted by the Security Industry Association (SIA), the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI), and the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR), 24 many survey participants believe that the quantity and quality of information has declined since Reg FD was implemented. In particular, public communications of issuers are believed to be of lower quality. Thus, market participants perceive Reg FD as dampening the £ow of information. Furthermore, sell-side analysts believe their recommendations are adversely a¡ected, portfolio managers have less con¢dence in analyst estimates, and buy-side analysts feel that Reg FD has had an adverse impact on their ability to advise portfolio managers. Ultimately, the costs of Reg FD can trickle down to retail investors who depend on professional advisors for investment decisions and information gleaned from the ¢nancial media. On the other hand, surveys of analysts and other investment professionals may 24 See Securities Industry Association (2001). merely re£ect their fear that Reg FD removes some of their privileges, rather than their concern for ''fairness''or for the well-being of small investors.
How does our evidence con¢rm or refute the concerns of investment professionals? Our summary of voluntary corporate disclosure suggests that it is not true that Reg FD has reduced the quantity of information. Our evidence on the accuracy of quarterly analyst forecasts indicates that Reg FD has not caused the quality of these forecasts to deteriorate. On the other hand, the evidence on forecast revision and belief jumbling suggests that preparing forecasts of future earnings has become more di⁄cult with the adoption of Reg FD. Our volume evidence suggests increased di¡erential informed judgment after the adoption of Reg FD. There is, of course, more than one interpretation of this evidence: With more corporate voluntary disclosure and more e¡ort devoted to ¢nancial analysis in place of privileged communication, a greater variety of information and opinions manifests itself in increased trading volume.
Our overall evidence suggests the following scenario to explain the e¡ect of Reg FD. With the adoption of Reg FD, corporations release more information about current quarter earnings, though not about more distant future earnings. Analysts forecasts about current quarter earnings do not signi¢cantly deteriorate and event-period return volatility does not change signi¢cantly. However the chilling e¡ect of Reg FD on future earnings information yields increased abnormal trading volume due to increased di¡erences in opinion and belief revisions among analysts. Fairness increases with no cost in terms of analyst activity regarding current quality earnings, but with an impact on their distant forecasts.
Our results call for more extensive investigation of the possible bene¢ts and costs of Reg FD. A vibrant and e⁄cient stock market is a source of growth and prosperity, and it is important to determine whether or not this new regulation causes more problems for the stock market than it solves.We can suggest several directions for future research. If market participants are still adjusting to the new regulation, more de¢nitive results will be possible once more data from the period since October 2000 has accumulated. Other markets may provide further evidence on the importance of Reg FD. Foreign securities listed in the U.S. are not subject to Reg FD and may show no post Reg FD changes in market behavior. If foreign securities analysts continue to obtain privileged information about U.S. corporations after Reg FD, overseas trading of U.S. stocks may di¡er from domestic trading. Finally, legislation similar to Reg FD may spread to other jurisdictions. The in£uence of such regulation may depend on market structure, legal systems, accounting quality, and other aspects of markets beyond the United States. 25, 26 25 For example, the securities laws of some Canadian provinces already imply a requirement similar to Reg FD, and some regulatory o⁄cials have expressed interest in further strengthening their e¡ect (see Canadian Press (2000)). U.K. regulators are contemplating strengthening their regulations. 26 See, for example, Fleming (2001) for Australian evidence.
